# $CHONKETHA Social Sentiment & Intelligence — 2026-08-18 13:00 UTC

> **Asset:** $CHONKETHA  
> **Momentum Status:** Heating Up  
> **Timestamp:** 2026-08-18 13:00 UTC (2026-08-18T13:00:00Z)  
> **Canonical URL:** https://cryptitalk.com/2026-08-18-13-00/crypto/CHONKETHA  
> **Overview Brief:** https://cryptitalk.com/2026-08-18-13-00/crypto.md  

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## 10-Minute Social Metrics
- **Posts Analyzed:** 1
- **Total Impressions:** 2.7K
- **Likes:** 36
- **Retweets:** 0
- **Comments:** 1

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## Momentum & Sentiment Analysis
Total Engagement - Comments: 1, Retweets: 0, Likes: 36, Impressions: 2697


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## Cited Community Posts & Evidence


### Post #1 by @zkDragon
> **Author:** [@zkDragon](https://x.com/zkDragon)  
> **Metrics:** 16 likes · 4 retweets · 6 comments · 1.7K views  


> **Source Link:** [https://x.com/zkDragon/status/2089652406623551911](https://x.com/zkDragon/status/2089652406623551911)  


> **Visual Context:** This image shows the title page of a cryptanalysis paper titled "From Round Skipping to S-Box Skipping: Attacking Poseidon's Partial Layer via Subspace Restriction" by Amit Singh Bhati, Sundas Tariq, and Tomer Ashur (3MI Labs/COSIC, KU Leuven), with their abstract describing the Generalized S-box Skipping (GSR) gadget that distinguishes 23 rounds of the Poseidon hash function regardless of round constants. The accompanying post contextualizes this work by noting that the attack assumes only one full round, highlighting the cryptographic principle that enough full-round S-boxes are needed to "diffuse" input entropy for partial rounds to remain safe—a vulnerability the paper explicitly exploits through subspace restriction techniques.  

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> "This assumes only one full round.

But, the Poseidon cryptanalysis is pretty clear that you need enough full round S-boxes to "diffuse" the input entropy, in order for partial rounds to be safe.

(And then the partial rounds are cheaply raising algebraic degree!)"




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## Contributing Accounts

- `@MetaGorgonite` (https://x.com/MetaGorgonite)